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This paper uses a panel of Swedish counties over the years 1988-99 to study the effects 
of unemployment on property crime rates. The period under study is characterized by great 
turbulence in the labor market – the variation in the unemployment rates is unprecedented in 
the second half of the century. The data hence provides a unique opportunity to investigate 
unemployment effects. According to the theory of economics of crime, increased 
unemployment rates lead to higher property crime rates. A fixed effects model is estimated to 
investigate this hypothesis. The model includes time- and county-specific  effects and a 
number of economic and socio-demographic variables in order to control for unobservables 
and covariates. In addition the model is estimated with linear and quadratic time trends to 
control for county-specific unobserved trends.  The result gives strong evidence that 
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During the deep recession of the early 1990’s Sweden experienced the worst economic 
crisis since the 1930’s. Unemployment rates rose dramatically and  public spending on 
unemployment benefits soared. In addition to such direct expenses, high unemployment is 
costly as it keeps parts of the labor force out of production and, if persistent, is likely to 
decrease the skills and know-how of the labor force. According to the theory of economics of 
crime that has been developed during the last decades, unemployment has yet another cost: 
increased property crime. 
Several studies have treated the effects of the massive rise in unemployment during the 
early 1990’s  – but none yet the impact on crime. This study investigates the effects of 
Swedish unemployment on crime using county panel data for 1988-99. Since the theory of 
economics of crime is first and foremost applicable on property crime the study focuses on 
these. The great variation in the unemployment rates characterizing the period under study is 
unprecedented in the late century. During the five first years of the period the unemployment 
rates more than quadrupled – from 2 percent in 1988 to 10.4 percent in 1993, from where it 
gradually declined to 6.4 percent in 1999. In comparison to other studies these substantial 
swings greatly facilitate the identification of the supposed effects of unemployment on crime. 
An increasing amount of empirical research treating the connection between 
unemployment and crime has been performed in recent years. Several of these use panel data: 
see for example  Raphael & Winter-Ebmer [2001]; Doyle, Ahmed & Horn [1999]; Levitt 
[1996]; and Gould, Weinberg & Mustard [2002] for American state- and county-level 
investigations; Entorf & Spengler [2000] for a German state level survey; and Papps & 
Winkelmann  [1998], for a study on regional data from New Zeeland. The four American 
studies all find support for the hypothesis that worsened conditions on the labor market are 
associated with higher property crime rates.
1 The results presented by Papps & Winkelmann 
and by Entorf & Spengler are, however, significantly weaker. The former imply that the 
unemployment rates only affect some kinds of damage crimes (for example littering and 
trespassing), and the results presented by Entorf & Spengler on the Bundesländer of the 
former West Germany are weak and ambiguous (even  negative estimates are reported for 
                                                 
1 While Raphael & Winter-Ebmer; Gould, Weinberg & Mustard; and Levitt investigate the effect of the 
unemployment rate on crime, Doyle, Ahmed & Horn measure the effect of changes in the over-all labor market 
situation by constructing a measure that includes wage levels, unemployment rates and unemployment benefits.   
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some theft crimes). When the united Germany is investigated the connection between 
unemployment and property crime is however stronger and positive for all crimes. 
Scorcu & Cellini [1998] use Italian time series data and find unemployment to be a 
significant explanatory variable for theft. Schuller [1986] also gains support for the positive 
relation between unemployment and crime using time series data on Sweden (for the years 
1966-82), while a community-level cross sectional analysis on the average of the years of 
1975 and 1976, yields insignificant results.  
Studies on individuals often focus on youths, since younger individuals, especially 
young men, tend to be over-represented in criminal records. For example Witte and Tauchen 
[1994] use American panel data on young men, and find that individuals who are employed 
tend to commit fewer crimes than those who are unemployed.  
The empirical evidence is thus ambiguous. The American studies mentioned above all 
support the positive relation between unemployment and crime, while studies on other 
countries in general obtain significantly weaker results. Further research, especially from 
countries other than the USA, is thus motivated. The insignificant results may be due to 
insufficient variation in the unemployment rates. In this light, the case of Swedish during the 
1990’s is especially interesting.  
2 Theoretical Framework 
2.1 The Individual’s Choice between Work and Crime 
The theory of the economics of crime, with the fundaments laid out by Becker [1968], 
considers crime as a type of work, i.e. as an activity that takes time and yields economic 
benefits. The theoretical model is thus foremost applicable on property crime, and when in the 
following “crime” is mentioned without any closer definition, it is in reference to property 
crime. This section describes a simple model for the supply of crime, which is based on 
models that have been presented by Ehrlich [1973] and Freeman [1999]. 
The model describes an individual’s choice between work and crime as source of 




2 In the model, W denotes the individual’s wage from honest work, Wb the returns 
from crime, A unemployment benefits and u the unemployment rate. u shall be interpreted as 
the probability that the individual is unemployed during the period. If the individual chooses 
crime, p denotes the probability that he/she gets caught and S the cost of punishment. It is 
assumed that all individuals are risk neutral and equal in moral considerations that might 
affect the willingness to commit crime.  
The individual chooses crime if the expected returns from crime is higher than the 
expected returns from work, that is if equation (1) is fulfilled: 
) ( ) ( W E W E b >   (1) 
Equation (1) thus implies that crime pays, in the sense that the individual chooses to 
commit crime only if the expected returns from crime exceeds that from honest work. An 
increase in the left-hand side increases the individual’s propensity to commit crime, while a 
higher value in the right-hand side increases the probability that honest work is chosen. I 
assume that the representative individual, ceteris paribus, prefers to be honest, so that work is 
chosen in the case that  ) ( ) ( W E W E b = .   
The left-hand side, the returns from crime, is a probability weighed average of the 
returns in case the individual is caught for a committed crime, p, and is not caught (1-p), 
respectively. If the individual chooses crime but is caught, the returns,  b W , is reduced by the 
cost of punishment, S. The expected returns from crime can thus be written as: 
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( S W p W p W E b b b - + - =       (2)  
The expected returns from work is affected by the unemployment rate and the 
unemployment benefit. The unemployment rate affects the individual’s possibilities of getting 
employed and hence also the expected wage, E(W). If the individual is employed in the 
period, he/she obtains wage W, while if unemployed he/she obtains the unemployment benefit 
A: 
uA W u W E + - = ) 1 ( ) (       (3) 
                                                 
2 Dynamic models as well as models that allows for the combination of work and crime have been 
developed (see for example Lochner (1999) or Witte and Tauchen (1994)), but the simple static model that is 




The restriction in equation (1) for the individual to choose crime can now be written as: 
uA W u S W p W p b b + - > - + - ) 1 ( ) ( ) )( 1 (     (4) 
Equation (4) shows how different variables affect the relation between the expected 
returns from work and crime. It is assumed that the risk of being unemployed in the period is 
less than the risk of getting caught for a committed crime, that is u<p.
3 Furthermore, it is 
assumed that the average cost of punishment, S, is higher than the cost of being unemployed, 
W-A. If these assumptions are fulfilled, it is more risky to commit crime than to choose an 
honest living. The returns from crime, Wb, thus has to be higher than the returns from work, 
W, to compensate for the increased risk associated with criminal activity. For the individual to 
choose crime, equation (4) thus stipulates that the returns from crime, Wb, increases if the risk 
of getting caught, p, or the cost of punishment, S, rise. Correspondingly, the compensating 
difference in returns that is demanded for the individual to choose crime instead of work, Wb-
W, decreases as the unemployment rate, u, or the cost of being unemployed, W-A, increase.  
In sum, higher levels of Wb and u make it more favorable for the individual to commit 
crime, while higher levels of  W, p and A raise the probability that the individual chooses 
honest work. 
2.2 The Aggregate Supply of Crime  
From the individual model above a function for the aggregate supply of crime can be 
derived. The fact that the model is estimated with aggregate data implies that the conclusions 
that could be drawn from the individual-based theoretical model need some modification.  
In equation (4) the individual’s choice between crime and work is affected by the wage, 
W, the returns from crime, Wh, the risk of getting caught, p, the unemployment rate, u, the cost 
of punishment, S, and the unemployment benefits, A. In equation (5) below the aggregate 
supply of crime,  B , is described as a function of the aggregate correspondences to these 
variables. The aggregate levels of the variables are denoted as  W ,  b W  and  A. Following 
Ehrlich (1973) an additional vector of variables, p , is included in order to capture the effect 
of other variables that affect the aggregate crime rates. 
                                                 
3 This is a reasonable assumption – the total clear up rate, which can be seen as a measure of the risk of 
getting caught, during 1988-99 averaged 30% (The National Council for Crime Prevention), while open 
unemployment at most barely exceeded 8% (The National Labour Market Board ).  
 
5
) , , , , , , ( p u A S W W p F B b =          (5)  
From equation (5) hypotheses regarding the influence of economic variables on 
aggregate crime can be developed. The expected effects on crime of changes in the aggregate 
levels of the returns from crime,  b W , the risk of getting caught, p, the cost of punishment, S, 
and the unemployment benefit,  A, respectively, do not differ from the individual model in 
section 2.1. Higher levels of  b W  and lower levels of p and S increase the expected returns 
from crime, and can thus be assumed to contribute to higher crime rates. Correspondingly, 
higher levels of  A make it more profitable to choose an honest living. 
The derivation of expected effects of unemployment, u, and wage levels,  W , at the 
aggregate level is somewhat more complicated: An increase in the unemployment rate, u, can 
be expected to affect crime through two channels: First, the expected returns from choosing 
an honest living decrease when the chances to find a job decline. Second, high unemployment 
rates put a downward pressure on the wages for those who do find work. Both of these effects 
contribute to lower the expected returns to work, making crime relatively more profitable. 
Thus we can expect a positive effect of unemployment on crime rates also at the aggregate 
level.  
When it comes to income, however, an increase in the aggregate income, W , not only 
implies higher returns to work, but also increased opportunities to commit crime through a 
higher supply of goods that are especially liable to be stolen. The expected effect of a change 
in aggregate income thus depends on which of these effects is the dominating: increased 
returns from honest work through higher income, or increased returns from crime through a 
higher supply of crime. 
The effect of  p  naturally depends on what factors are included in the vector. The 
variables to be included in p will be discussed in Section 4. 
3 Method  
In order to investigate the supposed connections between unemployment and crime a 
fixed effects-model is estimated. In accordance with the theoretical discussion above the 
following explanatory variables are included: unemployment, u, honest income, W (measured 
as deflated average income), and the risk of getting caught, p (measured as the overall clear  
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up rate, i.e. the proportion of crimes cleared by the police)
4.
5 The unemployment benefits,  A, 
are included in the measure of average income and the variable is thus not included separately 
in the model. The returns from crime,  b W , and the cost of punishment,  S, are excluded 
because of lack of data. It can however be assumed that the effects of these variables are, at 
least partly, incorporated by the average income. 
As Freeman [1999] points out, an estimated positive relation between unemployment 
and crime need not necessarily imply that unemployment  causes crime, but may merely 
reflect that both are affected by a third factor that has been omitted from the analysis. It is 
hence important to, in addition to the variables that are motivated by the theory of economics 
of crime, control for other factors that may affect this relation. By specifying a model that 
includes a relatively long list of control variables, dummy variables and time trends, we 
attempt to control for a variety of observable as well as unobservable covariates. Initially, a 
vector  kit p  of socio-demographic variables is added to the model (see section 4 for the 
definitions of these variables), and region- and time-specific effects ( i a  and  t t  respectively) 
are estimated to control for unobserved, county-specific effects and national shocks that affect 
the crime rates in the counties similarly. The resulting model is stated in equation (6):  
it t
k




3 2 1 ln ln ln ln ln    (6) 
Models similar to that specified in equation (6) – i.e. fixed effects models including 
region- and/or time-specific effects – have generally been used in previous research (see 
Entorf & Spengler [2000]; Ahmed, Doyle & Horn [1999]; Papps & Winkelmann [1998]; and 
Gould, Weinberg & Mustard [2002]). Since we specify a log-log model, the coefficients are 
interpreted as elasticities. 
Some of the variation in the crime rates may, however, be caused by trends in 
unobserved, county-specific factors. The availability of drugs and guns, as well as different 
policy decisions regarding for e xample crime-preventing measures, may constitute such 
                                                 
4 The same measure, the overall clear up rate, is used for all crimes. This shall not be interpreted as a 
direct measure of the risk of getting caught for the specific crime in question, but rather as a general measure of 
the resources of the police- and justice system. (Since the clear up rate varies greatly between crimes, in order to 
use p as a direct measure of the risk of getting caught one would need to use the clear up rates for the specific 
crimes). 
5 See Appendix for a closer definition of data.  
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factors. Hence, in addition to the model specified in equation (6), we want to control for 
county-specific time trends. The model in equation (6) is thus also estimated with linear and 
quadratic county-specific time trends ( t itime y  and 
2
t itime w  respectively). The resulting 
model is stated in equation (7):  
it t i t i t
k





3 2 1 ln ln ln ln ln   (7) 
The model in equation (7) accounts for a variety of possible sources of bias – stemming 
from observable as well as unobservable factors and trends. The risk that the estimates of the 
model suffer from an omitted variable bias is hence minimized. 
The risk of an endogeneity bias stemming from a simultaneous causality between 
unemployment and crime however still needs to be considered. The possibility of 
simultaneous causal effects between unemployment and crime is discussed in many of the 
articles referred to above.  
Raphael & Winter-Ebmer [2001] discuss the possibility that high or increasing crime in 
an area has a deterrent effect on the setting up of new industries or even scare existing 
companies away, something that naturally restrains employment in the region. It can also be 
assumed that individuals with a criminal record have fewer opportunities to find work, which 
may lead to lower employment in areas with many ex-criminals. Gould, Weinberg & Mustard 
[1998] furthermore discuss the hypothesis that companies in areas with high criminality are 
disadvantaged through having to pay higher wages in order to compensate their employees for 
the bad area. 
Raphael & Winter-Ebmer’s instrumental variable analysis (with instrumental variables 
for unemployment based on contracts for the defense industry and oil prices), however gains 
support for a causal direction from unemployment to crime. The instrumental variable 
estimations moreover yield higher coefficient values than the ordinary OLS regressions, 
something that implies that it could even be the case that the OLS regressions that are being 
used in this study underestimate the effect of unemployment on crime.   
It can also be discussed how probable the possible effects of crime on unemployment 
discussed above are in this context. That companies avoid areas with a high criminality is a 
plausible assumption, but probably this is a problem at the community rather than at the  
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county level. Hence there are good reasons to believe that the results of this study will reflect 
a causal direction from unemployment to crime. 
The reasoning on causality also applies to the clear up rates. Unlike unemployment, in 
this case we do expect to find effects in both directions – i.e. it is reasonable to believe that 
the crime rate has some influence on the proportion of crimes that are cleared. A 
straightforward attempt to isolate the effect of the clear up rate on the crime rate would be to 
replace the regressor with its lagged values. It is, however, possible that policy decisions that 
aim to increase the clear up rate are in general combined with crime preventive measures – 
i.e. that measures to decrease crime are focused both on preventive programs and on 
strengthening the police resources. If so, merely lagging the variable is not enough to isolate 
the effect of the clear up rate on crime, but the inclusion of crime preventive measures is also 
needed. In addition, the main purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of 
unemployment – not the clear up rate – on crime. Unless we have a significant correlation 
between clear up rates and unemployment, the possible simultaneity bias will not affect this. 
Since the individual is likely to base her/his decision on whether or not to commit crime on 
the current risk of getting caught, current instead of lagged clear-up rates are used here. 
4 Data 
The data consists of a panel of Swedish counties over the years 1988-99 – a period of 
great turbulence in the labor market. As can be seen in Figure 1 below, from 1990 until 1993 
the unemployment rate more than quadrupled. The large swings in the business cycle during 
the period provide a unique opportunity to study the effects of unemployment on crime, 
especially when using a fixed effects estimator, where the identifying variation comes from 
county-specific deviations in each time period from a county-specific time average.  
























Since the crime rates for the most turbulent period – the first years of the 1990’s – are 
only available at the county level
6, being able to cover this period in the analysis is a major 
advantage of choosing county-level, instead of community-level, data. If we were instead to 
use community level data we would miss the great increase in unemployment that takes place 
during the first half of the decade.  
The use of county level data, compared to data at the community level, has more 
advantages. One is that county level data minimizes the risk that the estimates are biased 
because of “the mobility of criminals” – i.e. that criminals may commit crimes in areas other 
than their residence district. This is not an unlikely phenomenon at the community level - 
especially in larger cities such as Stockholm where it is easy to move between communities 
and where the supply of crime may differ substantially between districts. The problem may to 
some extent also exist at the county level, but surely to a far smaller degree. In addition, as 
discussed in the previous section, county level data is less likely to be influenced by 
simultaneity bias stemming from the influence of the crime rates on the unemployment of an 
area. Finally, Swedish clear up rates are only available at the county level, and theory implies 
that this is an important variable to include in the analysis. Hence, unless other measures to 
capture the probability of getting caught are included, a community level analysis might 
suffer from an omitted variable bias. 
Data on crime rates is collected from The National Council for Crime Prevention and 
“crime” is defined as number of reported crimes per 100 000 persons.
7 Property crime 
consists of burglary, robbery, car theft, bike theft, theft/pilfering from motor vehicle and shop 
respectively, and fraud.
8 The distribution of these in 1999 is shown in  Figure 1. Property 
crime (as defined in this study) in 1999 constituted around 47 per cent of total crime, while 
                                                 
6 The official community level crime statistics runs from 1996. 
7 The use of number of reported crimes as a measure of the crime rate can be discussed since is does not 
reflect the number of crimes that are actually committed but only those that are reported. The propensity to 
report a crime can be assumed to differ between crimes. For example it should be high when a report is 
necessary for insurance purposes, for example car theft, while it is generally lower for violent crime. According 
to “The National Council for Crime Prevention” comparative studies on the number of reported crimes and the 
number of victims suggest that the number of reported crimes relatively well mirror the changes of the true crime 
rates. However, during the 1990’s the frequency of report seems to have diminished for fraud but increased for 
assault, (for example child assault and school violence). (The National Council for Crime Prevention , 2001) 
8 In addition, damage may be counted as a property crime, but since this type of crime does not yield any 
direct economic proceeds, damage is left out of this study. Correspondingly, robbery is here part of the property 
crimes, even though it is a crime that may lead to violence, since the main reason behind a robbery can be 
assumed to be the economic benefits (otherwise the individual could just as well commit “purely violent” crimes, 
such as assault or damage).  
 
10
violent crime accounted for 6 percent. The remaining 47 percent consists of for example 
damage, traffic offence and drug-related crime.
9  














In addition to the factors that are motivated by economic theory a number of control 
variables are generally included in models on crime and unemployment, in order to decrease 
the risk that social and demographic factors distort the results (see for example Entorf and 
Spengler; Raphael-Winter-Ebmer; Ahmed, Doyle and Horn; Gould, Weinberg and Mustard; 
and Schuller).  
The following control variables are included in this study: the proportion of divorced; 
population density; the proportion of the population with higher education (defined as college 
or higher levels); the proportion of persons on social allowance; the proportion of foreign 
citizens; the proportion of young men (15-24 years old); and sales of alcohol at the National 
Liquor Monopoly (Systembolaget).  
The choice of these variables is motivated either by previous research or on theoretical 
grounds. Martens [1992] suggests that the propensity to commit crime may be higher among 
those growing up with divorced parents, hence motivating the inclusion of divorced as a 
control variable. Population density is included in the model since among half of the total 
amount of the reported crimes occur in the three “city-counties” (the counties of Stockholm, 
Malmöhus and Västra Götaland), even though the population of these counties constitute only 
one third of the total population. (The National Council for Crime Prevention, 2001). 
                                                 


















Several of the socio-demographic variables are indirectly motivated by economic 
theory. Education is included since a higher education level in general increases the returns to 
work. Further, it can be assumed that individuals on social welfare and foreign citizens, 
ceteris paribus, face lower returns to work. Persons on social welfare are by definition low-
income earners, and Fritzell (2001) shows that average income during the 90’s was lower for 
persons born abroad than for those born in Sweden. Foreign citizens may in addition be 
disadvantaged by discrimination at the labor market or by the mere fact that an education 
from a foreign university may not be considered valid in Sweden.  
The proportion of young men is included in many investigations on crime and 
unemployment. Young men are over represented in the criminal records, and in addition, 
young individuals, who lack work experience and have not yet received any higher education, 
face lower returns to work.  
Consumption of alcohol has well known effects on the behavior and judgment, which 
may increase the propensity to commit crime. In addition, abuse of alcohol may inhibit the 
abilities to obtain and to keep a job and hence be connected with lower returns to work.
10  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and expected sign on all variables. 
                                                 
10 Closer definitions as well as sources for the data can be found in the Appendix.  
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Average  Standard 
deviation 
Min  Max  Expected 
sign 
Property Crime  5781  1647  2872  12093   
Violent Crime  564  163  276  1103   
Burglary  1425  376  764  2656   
Robbery  38  35  10  211   
Car Theft  515  275  173  1926   
Bike Theft  1340  460  409  2889   
Theft/Pilfering in Shop  604  176  265  1606   
Theft/Pilfering from 
Motor Vehicle 
1210  521  423  3396   
Fraud  648  551  232  6842   
Unemployment  5693  2959  820  12810  + 
Clear upRate  29996  5514  18000  47000  - 
Average Income (SEK 
1,000) 
103.82  6.92  89.07  136.00  +/- 
Education  18009  3921  11011  31828  - 
Males 15-24  6564  477  5535  7649  + 
Foreign Citizens  4232  1885  974  10050  + 
Persons on Social 
Allowance 
6656  1518  3077  10400  + 
Divorced  7056  1134  4801  10280  + 




41.6  54.4  2.6  278.0  + 
                                                 
11 The clear up rate has been cleared from an extreme value and the number of observations for this 
variable is thus 251.  
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      5 Result 
5.1 An Analysis of Aggregate Data 
Initially the model specification of equation (6), i.e. with time- and county-specific 
effects but without county-specific trends, is estimated. The results are presented in Table 2. 
To facilitate later discussion I denote this “model specification (1)”. 





No County –Specific Trend 
(1) 
Unemployment  0.1064** 
  (0.0442) 
Clear UpRate  -0.3872*** 
  (0.0596) 
Average Income  -0.3864 
  (0.7915) 
Education  -0.2818 
  (0.2079) 
Males 15-24  0.1038 
  (0.3254) 
Foreign Citizens  0.1333 
  (0.1163) 
Social Allowance  0.1905* 
  (0.1069) 
Divorced  0.6936* 
  (0.3977) 
Alcohol  0.0905 
  (0.1332) 
Population Density  -1.3547*** 
  (0.5202) 
                      Values in parenthesis denote standard error. 
                      ***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, 
                      *significant at the 10% level 
 
                                                 
12 The model controls for region- and time specific effects. The hypothesis that all fixed effects are equal 
to zero is rejected, as well as the hypothesis that all time effects equal to zero.  
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As can be seen in Table 2, the effect of unemployment on property crime is in line with 
the theoretical argument – the coefficient is positive and significant at the five percent level. 
The clear up rate is negative and significant at the one percent level of confidence. 
Furthermore the model yields positive coefficients for divorced and persons on social 
allowance. The coefficient of population density is relatively strong and negative in sign. This 
is contrary to what was expected according to the discussion on the control variables in the 
previous section. The reason for our result may be that the regression does not measure the 
effect of population density per se (any constant characteristics are incorporated into the 
county-specific effects), but rather the effect of changes in the variable. It may be the case 
that a negative development of the population density of a county is related to other factors 
that affect the crime rates, or perhaps, that some crimes in fact benefit from less population 
density (for example burglary in remote areas, or bank robberies in counties where the 
distance between the police stations is great).      
The coefficients in  Table 2 shall be interpreted as elasticities. The unemployment 
coefficient thus implies that an increase of 1 percent in the unemployment rate is expected to 
increase the property crime rate by 0.11 percent. In Sweden, during the period under study, on 
average 596,697  property crimes were reported annually. The result thus implies that an 
increment in unemployment of 1 percent, ceteris paribus, is related to around 660 more 
property crimes. As an example, we assume an increase in the unemployment rate from 4 to 5 
percent, i.e. of 25 percent. The estimated elasticity of 0.11 per cent can, by this somewhat 
simplified example, be assumed to increase property crime with around 2.75 per cent, which 
equals 16,400 more property crimes. It shall be pointed out that an increase from 4 to 5 
percent in the unemployment rate is by no means an unrealistic figure. As was seen in Figure 
1, during the period under study the unemployment rates spanned from 1.5 percent to 10.4 
percent. 
Does the result above really mirror the relation between unemployment and crime, or is 
it merely the result of the development of some unobserved county-specific trend that has not 
been included in the model? To answer this question, equation (7), including county-specific 
time trends, is estimated. Table 3 presents the results of the model including only linear trends 
as well as with both linear and quadratic trends. These are denoted model specification (2) 
and (3) respectively.  













Linear and Quadratic 
Trends (3) 
Unemployment  0.0737  0.0630 
  (0.0487)  (0.0494) 
Clear UpRate  -0.3257***  -0.3120*** 
  (0.0630)  (0.0652) 
Average Income  -0.9537  1.9519 
  (0.8858)  (1.4634) 
Education  -0.2179  -0.2125 
  (0.2148)  (0.2953) 
Males 15-24  -0.4241  0.2394 
  (0.9601)  (1.3028) 
Foreign Citizens  0.0107  -0.0421 
  (0.1683)  (0.2250) 
Social Allowance  -0.0645  0.2153 
  (0.1449)  (0.1915) 
Divorced  1.5620  0.4772 
  (1.3322)  (1.5347) 
Alcohol  0.1892  0.1827 
  (0.2125)  (0.2418) 
Population Density  3.3925  6.7368 
  (2.2696)  (5.1728) 
     Values in parenthesis denote standard error. 
     ***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, 
                    *significant at the 10% level 
 
As can be seen in the table, the inclusion of county specific time trends does not alter 
the sign of the coefficient estimates of unemployment  – they are still positive in model 
specifications (2) and (3). The size of the coefficients however decreases – from 0.11 in the 
                                                 
13 The model controls for region- and time specific effects, as well as county-specific time trends. The 
hypothesis that all fixed and time effects are equal to zero is rejected, as well as the hypothesis that all time 





specification without county-specific trends to 0.07 in the model with linear trends and 0.06 in 
the model with both trends – and the relation is no longer significant. The p-value is 0.131 in 
the model with only linear trends and 0.205 when both linear and quadratic trends are 
included.  
The clear up rate is negative at the one percent level of confidence for both model 
specifications. The coefficients for divorced and persons on social allowance turn 
insignificant. The coefficient of population density changes in sign and becomes highly 
insignificant when state-specific time trends are included. This supports the hypothesis that 
this variable is correlated with some unobserved county-specific trend variable, which effect 
is now incorporated by the county-specific time trend variables.  
The analysis of aggregate data might however be problematic. The reason is that the 
effect of unemployment may differ between crimes. We hence risk that unemployment effects 
are “blurred” or even cancel out in aggregate data. In the next section, an analysis on 
disaggregate data will therefore be conducted. 
5.2 An Analysis of Disaggregate Data 
As described above, the category “property crime” is composed of several different 
crimes, namely burglary, robbery, theft/pilfering from shops and motor vehicles respectively, 
car and bike theft, and fraud. It is possible that the effect of unemployment differs between 
these crimes. For example the possibilities to commit fraud may be better for those who hold 
certain types of jobs, which implies that unemployment could be negatively correlated with 
this specific crime. It can also be the case that increased unemployment implies less people in 
movement and less money in circulation, which decreases the supply of crimes that demand a 
personal meeting (for example personal robbery, which constitute the majority of reported 
robberies). Hence it is motivated to conduct an analysis on the specific property crimes.  
The estimated unemployment coefficient of the extended fixed effects-model, including 
all socio-demographic variables,  for all property crimes is presented in  Table 4 .
14 The 
unemployment coefficient of the three model specifications for aggregate property crime is, 
for the sake of comparison, reproduced in the first row of table.   
                                                 
14 The result including all explanatory variables (except dummy variables) is available in the Appendix.  
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Aggregate Property Crime  0.1064**  0.0737  0.0630 
  (0.0442)  (0.0487)  (0.0494) 
Burglary  0.1465***  0.1227**  0.1249** 
  (0.0498)  (0.0501)  (0.0485) 
Car Theft  0.1593**  0.1532**  0.1744** 
  (0.0793)  (0.0760)  (0.0770) 
Bike Theft  0.0715*  0.0606  0.0575* 
  (0.0387)  (0.0381)  (0.0342) 
Pilfering Motor Vehicle  0.0783  -0.0052  -0.0148 
  (0.0526)  (0.0541)  (0.0543) 
Pilfering Shop  0.0686  -0.0933  -0.1120 ¤ 
  (0.0756)  (0.0856)  (0.0898) 
Robbery  -0.0599  -0.0454  -0.0032 
  (0.0933)  (0.1057)  (0.1054) 
Fraud  0.2166  0.2226 ¤  0.1672 ¤ 
  (0.1563)  (0.1844)  (0.1902) 
                 ¤ The hypothesis that all time trends are equal to zero is not rejected (at the 10 % level) 
 
The result in Table 4 confirms the connection between unemployment and crime for 
burglary, car theft and bike theft respectively. The two former are significant (at the five 
percent level) in all model specifications, and the latter is significant at the ten percent level in 
specifications (1) and (3). The effect is strongest for car theft and burglary (around 0.16 per 
cent and 0.12 per cent respectively). The coefficient for car theft is even increasing when 
linear and quadratic trends are included. If we repeat the hypothetical example of the previous 
section regarding the effect of a one-percentage point change in unemployment, the estimates 
in  Table 4 imply that a change in the unemployment rate from 4 to 5 percent will yield 
approximately a 3-percentage increase in burglary a 4-percentage increase in car theft. 
                                                 
 
15 The model controls for region- and time specific effects. The hypothesis that all fixed and time effects 
are equal to zero is rejected, as well as the hypothesis that all time trends are equal to zero (except for the cases 




The remaining crimes have insignificant unemployment coefficients and the sign of the 
estimates vary. One explanation for the insignificant and sometimes negative coefficients can 
be given by the argument regarding decreased opportunities above, i.e. that the positive 
effects of increased unemployment on the economic incentives for crime are eliminated by 
negative effects on the supply of property crimes that demand a personal meeting. Another 
plausible explanation may be that the insignificant result for example for robbery stems from 
a lack of variation in data, as the number of observations in some regions grows small when 
property crime is divided into separate groups. 
The results in Table 4 indicate that the effect of unemployment on property crime does 
vary across the different crimes. Hence we can conclude that it is not suitable to sum specific 
crimes into an aggregate measure when the aim is to explain crime.  
6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks  
The results of this study give strong evidence that unemployment has a positive effect 
on some property crimes. From the disaggregate analysis we obtain significant unemployment 
coefficients in all model specifications for burglary and car theft, and significant effects are 
obtained in model specifications (1) and (3) for bike theft. The risk of omitted variable bias is 
minimized through the inclusion of a wide range of control variables, dummies for fixed- and 
time-effects and county-specific trends. It is furthermore plausible that the estimated relation 
does mirror a causal effect from unemployment to crime, and not the other way around. The 
analysis hence strengthens the belief that unemployment is an explanatory factor for at least 
some property crimes. None of the other property crimes are significantly affected in any of 
the model specifications. 
The results of this study regarding the connection between unemployment and 
aggregate property crime is, however, somewhat ambiguous. Model specification (1) (without 
county-specific time trend variables) yields positive and significant estimates for aggregate 
property crime, but the inclusion of county-specific time trend variables weakens the result 
and the relation between unemployment and crime is no longer significant. One could hence 
argue that the significant result in the model without state specific trends is affected by some 
omitted variable related to unemployment, which effect is incorporated by the inclusion of 
state-specific trends.   
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The inclusion of trend variables, however, remarkably reduces the number of degrees of 
freedom – twenty additional parameters are added to the model as model specification (2) is 
estimated, and forty as both linear and quadratic trends are included. Considering this, the fact 
that the p-values increase does not necessarily mean that we should dismiss the connection 
between unemployment and crime, but could be the result of the decreasing number of 
degrees to freedom. Further investigation with an augmented data set seem to be the correct 
way of establishing which of these cases is the more plausible. 
In addition, as was indicated in the section above, a problem with aggregate data is that 
the effect of unemployment differs across crimes. Effects of unemployment on certain 
property crimes may hence “be blurred” or even cancel out in an aggregate specification. We 
conclude that unless the variation in the separate crimes is too small, disaggregate data is to be 
preferred. 
It is interesting to compare these results to those of similar studies. In the study of 
separate property crimes in West German Bundesländer by Entorf & Spengler [2000], the 
estimated unemployment elasticities are in general around zero. Their analysis of united 
Germany however  yields elasticities that are significantly higher, around one percent for 
robbery and theft.  
The corresponding elasticities for burglary and car theft obtained in this study  – the 
crimes that are significant in all model specifications – are around 0.12 and 0.16 respectively 
in all model specifications. For aggregate property crime, the corresponding estimate, 
obtained in model specification (1), is 0.11. One shall keep in mind though, that this estimate 
is not robust for the inclusion of county-specific time trends. The estimated elasistities of this 
study are hence within the interval of the estimations of Entorf & Spengler.  
Several studies use log-linear models, which means that the coefficient value shall be 
interpreted as the percentage effect of a 1-percentage point change in the unemployment rate. 
In Raphael & Winter-Ebmer [2001] an increase of 1-percentage point in the unemployment 
rate is estimated to raise property crime by 1.6-5 percent, depending on the model 
specification. The highest values are obtained in models where instrumental variables have 
been used for unemployment. Gould, Weinberg & Mustard [1998] estimate the corresponding 
effect among males without higher education (non-college) to 2.2-2.8 percent. In  Levitt’s  
 
20
investigation [1996], a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment is estimated to yield 
around 1 percent’s higher property crime rates.
16 In conclusion the estimated effect on 
property crime in these studies lies between 1-5 percent, which is well in accordance with the 
results of this study; an increment of 3 percent in burglary and 4 percent in car theft as 
unemployment rates rise from 4 to 5 percent. The corresponding number for aggregate crime, 
based on the result of model specification (1), is 2.75 percent.  
The clear up rate is highly significant in all aggregate property crime model 
specifications and its coefficient is larger than that of unemployment. This suggests that the 
clear up rate is an important explanatory variable for the crime rates. It is, however, likely 
that, in addition to the expected deterrent effect of the clear up rate on crime, there is also an 
effect the other way around – from crime to clear up rates. We cannot, from the results of this 
study, draw any conclusions on the relative sizes of these simultaneous effects.  
It shall not be forgotten that the unemployment rate is not the only possible measure of 
the situation on the labor market. Doyle, Ahmed & Horn [1999] use a broader definition of 
the labor market situation when measuring  its effect on crime, which in addition to 
unemployment rates also includes wage levels and unemployment benefits. It is possible that 
such a measure is more appropriate to use in economics of crime-related investigations. An 
interesting task for future studies could thus be to develop a method to measure the over all 
Swedish labor market situation and its effects on crime. 
In summary,  the results of the panel data analysis yields strong evidence that 
unemployment has a positive effect on certain specific property crimes. Highly significant 
coefficients are obtained for burglary and car theft in all model specifications, and bike theft 
is significant at the ten percent level in model specifications (1) and (3). Estimating the effect 
on total property crime however yields a more ambiguous result. Significance is obtained in 
the basic model specification with time and county-specific effects, but not as time trend 
variables are included. It shall however be noted that the inclusion of time trend variables 
greatly reduces the number of degrees to freedom.  
The results of this study may have consequences for the view on the cost of 
unemployment. Increased unemployment does not solely lead to expenses that are directly 
                                                 
16 Property crime is in the above three studies defined as burglary, theft/pilfering and motor 
vehicle theft.  
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related to unemployment, but has also indirect effects in the form of increased property crime. 






Explanatory Variables and Descriptive Statistics  
All explanatory variables in this study, except f or the clear up rate, average income, 
sales of alcoholic beverages and population density, are indicated per 100,000 persons. Data 
on unemployment has been collected from The National Labour Market Board (www.ams.se) 
and measures the number of persons in “open unemployment”. The clear up rate measures the 
number of cleared crimes per 100,000 reported crimes during a year and is collected from The 
National Council for Crime Prevention. Data on average income, higher education, males 15-
24, divorced and population density is from the Statistics Sweden database ”Sveriges 
statistiska databaser” (see www.scb.se). Average income is defined as average deflated 
income from work in SEK1,000 before tax.
17 (The measure includes income from work 
pensions, unemployment benefits and sick pay). Higher education is defined as the number of 
persons 16-74 with college or higher education and population density is measured as 
population per km
2. Data on social allowances is from The National Board of Health and 
Welfare and measures the number of persons benefiting from social allowances in the ages 
20-64. Alcohol is defined as the sales at the National Liquor Monopoly (Systembolaget) in 
liters of 100-percent alcohol per person 15 years and older, and the data is from the sales 
statistics of the National Liquor Monopoly (data until 1998 is collected from The National 
Board of Health and Welfare’s database ”Hur mår Sverige”, while data for 1999 has been 
gathered directly from the National Liquor Monopoly).  
 
                                                 
17 Because of changes in the tax regulations that were put in force following the tax reform in 1991 the 
definition of average income differs before and after the reform. For the years 1988-90, apart from income from 
work, capital income is also included, while average income of the years after the reform only measures income 
from work. Data before 1991 furthermore measures the income for all persons 20 years and older, while data for 
the later years measures the income of all persons 16 years and older. To the extent that the effects of these 




Tables A.2-A.4 present the result model specifications 1 -3 for the specific property 
crimes (estimates for dummy variables are excluded). 
Table A.2 FE Specific Crimes, No Trends
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LnRobbery  LnFraud 
LnUnemployment  0.1465***  0,1593**  0.0715*  0.0783  0.0686  -0.0599  0.2166 
  (0.0498)  (0.0793)  (0.0387)  (0.0526)  (0.0756)  (0.0933)  (0.1563) 
LnClear upRate  -0.117*  -0,2119**  -0.1933***  -0.1395**  0.0042  -0.3338***  -0.762*** 
  (0.0671)  (0.107)  (0.0522)  (0.0709)  (0.1019)  (0.1258)  (0.2107) 
LnAverage Income  -0.6012  -1.0309  -0.1206  -0.8731  1.631  -1.7158  -3.0707 
  (0.8909)  (1.4197)  (0.6924)  (0.9409)  (1.3521)  (1.6702)  (2.7968) 
LnEducation  -0.4081*  0.2805  0.0377  0.1252  -0.5043  -0.3707  -0.8238 
  (0.234)  (0.3729)  (0.1818)  (0.2471)  (0.3551)  (0.4387)  (0.7345) 
LnMales 15-24  0.0816  0.751  0.5753**  -0.4888  0.9542*  0.2471  0.8179 
  (0.3663)  (0.5837)  (0.2847)  (0.3868)  (0.5559)  (0.6867)  (1.1499) 
LnForeign Citizens  0.154  -0.1582  -0.3897***  0.5711***  0.0362  0.4287*  0.4654 
  (0.1309)  (0.2086)  (0.1017)  (0.1383)  (0.1987)  (0.2454)  (0.411) 
LnSocial Allowance  0.0825  0.2546  0.2806***  0.3124**  -0.0311  0.2504  -0.2872 
  (0.1204)  (0.1918)  (0.0936)  (0.1271)  (0.1827)  (0.2257)  (0.3779) 
LnDivorced  1.5043***  1,6646**  -0.3095  1.6781***  0.0537  1.32  -1.7346 
  (0.4477)  (0.7134)  (0.3479)  (0.4728)  (0.6794)  (0.8393)  (1.4054) 
LnAlcohol  -0.0238  0.0703  -0.1931*  -0.1801  0.6495***  0.441  0.0791 
  (0.15)  (0.239)  (0.1166)  (0.1584)  (0.2276)  (0.2812)  (0.4708) 
LnPopulation Density  -2.3073***  -1,993**  -2.4905***  -2.7716***  0.8113  1.4805  -2.2284 
  (0.5856)  (0.9932)  (0.4551)  (0.6184)  (0.8887)  (1.0979)  (1.8384) 
           Values in parenthesis denote standard error. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level,  
*significant at the 10% level 
 
                                                 
18 The model controls for region- and time specific effects. The hypothesis that all fixed and time effects 




Table A.3 FE Specific Crimes, Linear Trend
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LnRobbery  LnFraudf 
LnUnemployment  0.1227**  0.1532**  0.0606  -0.0052  -0.0933  -0.0454  0.2226 
   (0.0501)  (0.0760)  (0.0381)  (0.0541)  (0.0856)  (0.1057)  (0.1844) 
LnClear upRate  0.0073  0.1090  -0.0958*  -0.1018  0.0250  -0.3029**  -1.0199*** 
   (0.0649)  (0.0985)  (0.0493)  (0.0701)  (0.1108)  (0.1369)  (0.2388) 
LnAverage Income  -2.1594**  -3.2933**  -1.2327*  -2.1390**  -0.0986  -0.7486  0.3135 
   (0.9127)  (1.3841)  (0.6930)  (0.9856)  (1.5577)  (1.9246)  (3.3571) 
LnEducation  -0.5869***  0.1044  0.1389  0.0969  -0.3469  -0.3775  -0.6156 
   (0.2214)  (0.3357)  (0.1681)  (0.2390)  (0.3778)  (0.4668)  (0.8142) 
LnMales 15-24  -0.1884  -1.0327  0.0971  -2.2185**  0.5807  0.6504  2.9695 
   (0.9893)  (1.5002)  (0.7512)  (1.0682)  (1.6884)  (2.0861)  (3.6387) 
LnForeign Citizens  0.1011  0.0016  -0.2425*  0.1931  -0.2877  -0.1196  0.5032 
   (0.1735)  (0.2630)  (0.1317)  (0.1873)  (0.2960)  (0.3658)  (0.6380) 
LnSocial Allowance  -0.5076***  -0.3482  0.3304***  -0.0710  0.1619  -0.2440  -0.5792 
   (0.1493)  (0.2264)  (0.1134)  (0.1612)  (0.2548)  (0.3149)  (0.5492) 
LnDivorced  4.4278***  4.5702**  1.3134  5.3075***  -3.0899  1.7341  -8.1747 
   (1.3727)  (2.0816)  (1.0423)  (1.4823)  (2.3428)  (2.8946)  (5.0490) 
LnAlcohol  -0.0324  -0.0485  -0.2512  0.3445  0.6366*  -0.5333  0.6750 
   (0.2190)  (0.3321)  (0.1663)  (0.2365)  (0.3738)  (0.4618)  (0.8056) 
LnPopulation 
Density  3.2019  7.4387**  1.1699  3.9393  2.1910  2.1388  -11.1134 
   (2.3386)  (3.5464)  (1.7757)  (2.5252)  (3.9912)  (4.9314)  (8.6017) 
Values in parenthesis denote standard error. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level,  
*significant at the 10% level 
f The hypothesis that all time trend variables are equal to zero is not rejected (at the 10 % level) 
 
                                                 
19 The model controls for region- and time specific effects. The hypothesis that all fixed and time effects 
are equal to zero is rejected, as well as the hypothesis that all time trends are equal to zero (except for the cases 




Table A.4, FE Specific Crimes, Linear and Quadratic Trends
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LnRobbery  LnFraudf 
LnUnemployment  0.1249**  0.1744**  0.0575*  -0.0148  -0.1120  -0.0032  0.1672 
   (0.0485)  (0.0770)  (0.0342)  (0.0543)  (0.0898)  (0.1054)  (0.1902) 
LnClear upRate  0.0470  0.1774*  -0.0492  -0.0829  0.0384  -0.2577*  -1.0839*** 
   (0.0639)  (0.1015)  (0.0451)  (0.0715)  (0.1184)  (0.1390)  (0.2506) 
LnAverage Income  -1.9816  -4.2340*  -0.2441  -0.5898  0.7946  5.4008*  9.3145 
   (1.4351)  (2.2796)  (1.0126)  (1.6063)  (2.6579)  (3.1209)  (5.6283) 
LnEducation  -0.5938**  -0.2590  -0.1238  0.2004  0.0353  0.3325  -0.0902 
   (0.2896)  (0.4600)  (0.2043)  (0.3241)  (0.5363)  (0.6297)  (1.1357) 
LnMales 15-24  -1.8203  -2.9451  -1.2701  -3.2527**  0.1298  5.7777**  8.7586* 
   (1.2775)  (2.0293)  (0.9014)  (1.4299)  (2.3661)  (2.7782)  (5.0103) 
LnForeign Citizens  -0.2119  -0.3845  -0.3809**  -0.0184  -0.4138  0.1664  0.9810 
   (0.2206)  (0.3504)  (0.1557)  (0.2469)  (0.4086)  (0.4797)  (0.8652) 
LnSocial 
Allowance  -0.3090  -0.4703  0.3281**  -0.0425  -0.0144  -0.3067  0.2691 
   (0.1878)  (0.2983)  (0.1325)  (0.2102)  (0.3478)  (0.4084)  (0.7365) 
LnDivorced  3.5201**  3.5978  1.3803  5.4115***  -1.6131  2.9914  -13.2153** 
   (1.5050)  (2.3906)  (1.0619)  (1.6845)  (2.7873)  (3.2728)  (5.9023) 
LnAlcohol  0.1589  0.0483  -0.0680  0.2912  0.7726*  -1.0452**  0.2666 
   (0.2371)  (0.3767)  (0.1673)  (0.2654)  (0.4392)  (0.5156)  (0.9299) 
LnPopulation 
Density  11.1078**  9.0484  8.9867**  11.6268**  18.2924*  15.0130  -15.8054 
   (5.0727)  (8.0578)  (3.5792)  (5.6777)  (9.3949)  (11.0313)  (19.8943) 
Values in parenthesis denote standard error. 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level,  
*significant at the 10% level  
f The hypothesis that all time trend variables are equal to zero is not rejected (at the 10 % level) 
                                                 
20 The model controls for region- and time specific effects. The hypothesis that all fixed and time effects 
are equal to zero is rejected, as well as the hypothesis that all time trends are equal to zero (except for the cases 
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